No doubt there is a team of staf-fers from the Prime Minister’s Office and Privy Council who have spent the autumn studying how past governments were able to sell (or not sell) major new policy initiatives such as the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement or the Charlottetown accord.

The recently announced Canada-U.S. shared border plan might indeed be the greatest step in co-operation between the two countries since the North American Free Trade Agreement of 1993, as the Harper government claims. But, unfortunately for governments, public assessment of complicated agreements and policy documents is extremely subjective.

Few voters will have any idea what the text of this agreement or any other controversial policy actually says. But that won’t stop people from making a snap judgment about whether it is good or bad policy.

Often, people use a policy initiative as a surrogate to send the government a message about their pre-existing anger or frustration. A case in point was the ill-fated Charlottetown accord, which died in a fiercely fought referendum in 1992.

On the morning after that referendum, you would have been hard-pressed to find six people who actually understood what was in the Charlottetown accord, which would have abolished the current Senate and established an elected upper house — something Western Canada has wanted for decades. Yet, Western Canada led the charge to defeat Charlottetown because detractors had successfully cast the agreement as the “Mulroney deal.”

Or voters might embrace a policy initiative without worrying about the long-term consequences because they feel comfortable with the government of the day. Would the public have enthusiastically endorsed the Chrétien government’s drive to get rid of the deficit in just four years had they realized the long-term effects of cuts in transfer payments to the provinces?

Or, voters can flip-flop. Ex-ample: when the auto pact was signed in 1965, the Canadian Left disparaged it as a sellout to the Detroit automakers. But when Canada-U.S. free trade was negotiated, the auto pact had become the holy grail that could not be touched.

This time, the Left didn’t even bother waiting for the actual agreement on the border plan to be made public before pouncing on it as another appeasement to Washington.

So, support for a Canada-U.S. border action plan is hardly a given, because a lot will depend on the public’s mood.

There is a very strong case to be made for this perimeter agreement, announced by Prime Minister Stephen Harper and U.S. President Barack Obama, even if it doesn’t have treaty status. Something is better than nothing. Had the former Liberal government the foresight to pursue a customs treaty after NAFTA was signed, Canadian businesses would have been spared a lot of grief since 9/11.

Under the current political climate in both countries, a full customs and border perimeter agreement probably isn’t possible, which is why the two governments have announced what is really a glorified to-do list. Much will depend on what happens in the U.S. presidential elections in 2012. In addition, a lot will depend on the bureaucracies of both countries.

That presents the Harper government with a bit of a communications dilemma. The agreement is being perceived as a trade-off rather than a partnership: Canada is willing to give in to U.S. demands for stricter security measures on travellers and goods in return for a more fluid border for its exports.

Canadians will be wondering whether the Americans will deliver their end of the bargain. Ottawa will have to be able to point to validation fairly quickly.

To do this, the Harper government has two very important allies — the Canadian Manufacturers & Exporters Association and the Canadian Chief Executives Council. But even with their support, it may be some time before Canadian voters believe they are seeing a return on their trust.

This is why it was probably a dumb move for Harper to travel down to Washington to announce this agreement, or work plan, or whatever you want to call it.

Wouldn’t it have been better optics for Harper and Obama to have met at some place close to the border?  IE